Industrial realisations and the transformation of social political landscapes

This section began with curiosity about the industrial history of Singapore. Knowledge on this subject matter is unavoidable especially in relation to the the research interests of this publication.

Being a former colony of the British empire, Singapore was never envisioned to be an independent state. Despite being a hub of economic activity due to its location and port, it was deemed economically unviable to rely solely on those factors. One of the proposed solutions was merger with Malaya. Malaya which became Malaysia in 1963 attained full independence from the British colonial government in 1957. The merger was a failure and after two years,1963-1965, Singapore became an independent nation state.

In April 1961, the governing body of Singapore had already put into motion the State of Singapore Development plan 1961-1964. The goals of this plan were to create jobs for Singapore’s growing population, while expanding the economy through industrialisation.

There was near consensus on expediting the industrialisation process as Euston Quah points out that “at the time, nearly all contemporary theories of economic development were recommending rapid industrialisation as the first step towards economic growth. Therefore, the decision of Singapore to focus on industrialisation seems like a step in keeping with this conventional counsel.”1

Internally, mass unemployment was an issue that needed to be solved. This was due to a rapidly growing population after the war that ended in 1945. According to Lee Soo Ann, “the post-war scene was consequently dominated by fears of how a rapidly growing population could be accommodated on a small island, more specifically in terms of catering to the needs of a high proportion of dependents and to the subsequent desire for employment by these same dependents when they grew up.”2 This notion is further corroborated in the book, Theatres of Memory.

“To policymakers, socio-economic issues such as population growth underpinned the political turmoil and industrial unrest in post-war Singapore.”3


This led to the government adopting industrialisation as a means to boost employment opportunities and economic growth. Unemployment was not seen as a problem before the war because migrants saw their stay in Singapore as temporary. However, as workers decided to settle down and children were being born in the country, the idea of returning seemed less feasible. Individuals who first came as transient workers were starting to embrace Singapore as their newly adopted home.

In addition to acquiring capital, Singapore had to gain expertise and technical knowledge of manufacturing from nations that were already developed. This mostly meant the western states.Three non-governmental organisations concerned with development - the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(IBRD) or World Bank, the Colombo Plan for technical cooperation and the United Nations divisions for development and technical expertise  - were important to Singapore as these organisations emphasized economic and technical cooperation.

The UNDP and Colombo plan were keen to prevent Singapore from turning into a communist state and this led to experts from these organisations recommending capitalist forms of development. The proposals of the World Bank did not prove to be of much use. The United Nations Division for development and technical expertise was the most effective in helping to devise Singapore’s economic plans. 

The Dutch economic advisor, Albert Winsemius, who was part of the UN mission survey team is often credited with being one of the brains behind Singapore’s economic success. His report A Proposed Industrialisation Programme for the State of Singapore(The Winsemius Report) acted as the main economic plan in the 1960s in tandem with the original development plan. Albert Winsemius emphasized the need for a crash programme to alleviate the immediate issue of unemployment because the ten year industrialization programme which could not be expected to immediately create its full impact.

He was convinced that Singapore had to manufacture for the global market rather than the local. This included the western nations and other parts of Asia. In light of this proposal, the Economic Development Board was set up in 1961 to seek new markets while also persuading foreign capital to invest. Lee Soo Ann highlights the importance of the EDB which had two primary functions - “to make a success of industrial promotion and to be the instrument of the government’s direct participation in industrial activity.”4 This was in line with another proposition by Albert Winsemus which was that industrialisation had to be led by foreign capital instead of state capital. He believed that the state’s main role was to engineer a conducive environment for the stabilisation of labour and capital. He was optimistic as he mentioned in his report that “Singapore has the basic assets for industrialisation. Her greatest asset is the high aptitude of her people to work in manufacturing industries. They can be ranked among the best factory workers in the world.”5

With this in mind, Singapore was ready to propel itself into the world market by transforming parts of the country into industrial estates. The first area to be completely transformed was Jurong. Originally a “swampland” that was “littered with villages and crocodile rivers”, Jurong laid the foundation for how Singapore would accomplish the goals of its industrial plans. Jurong was a huge undertaking as the government had no experience in building an industrial zone from almost nothing. According to Loh Kah Seng, the project could only be accomplished with the help of a Japanese engineer, Y. Yanagisawa and his team of six who endorsed the prospects of heavy industry and believed in its success.

Loh Kah Seng also mentions that “Jurong took shape according to a system of zoned development”6  which was the demarcation of a piece of land for one type of development only. Heavy industry that comprised iron, steel works, shipyards, chemical and petrochemicals was to be sited along the coasts while light industries such as food, paint and garments could be located closer to the housing areas of the first neighbourhood. Factories were also being built in other residential areas to accommodate the wider population. These factories resembled the social housing flats built by the HDB(Housing Development Board) and housed mostly light industries. This strategy effectively tapped into the labour pool that was available in these housing estates. Women workers were now initiated into the workforce as they made up the bulk of labour in these light industry factories.

Not only was the physical landscape altered to pave the way for these industrial aspirations, the social political landscape was also due for a makeover to suit the new era of industrial and capital relations.

Besides economic advice, Albert Winsemius also recommended two political suggestions to the Prime Minister.

The first being to “eliminate the communists”.

“As an economist, I’m not interested what you do to them, you can throw them in jail, you can throw them out of the country, you can even kill them.”7

“If you don’t eliminate them in government, in unions, in the streets,  forget about economic development. This part better be taken out but for history’s sake you don’t care to do it.”8

At this point in Singaporean history, there was also a lot of labour unrest due to exploitation of the working masses by employers of the time. Trade unions had to fight tenaciously to achieve concessions for workers. The climate of Singapore’s social and political landscape matched its sweaty weather due to “militant unionism” as retroactively claimed by the government. These “fighting machines”9 were also gaining traction in the political scene.

On his first visit to Singapore as part of the United Nations survey mission, Albert Winsemius claimed that, “It was bewildering. There were strikes about nothing. There were communist-inspired riots almost everyday and everywhere.”10

At the time, the People’s Action Party was composed of two factions: the leftists and the moderates. Members of the left leaning faction were accused of having ties to the communists and consistently blamed for inciting disruptive action. This resulted in the left faction forming a new party, Barisan Socialis. The two competing political factions formed different associations to address labour concerns. The left leaning Barisan Socialis which was led by Lim Chin Siong formed SATU(Singapore Association of Trade Unions) while the “moderate” People’s Action Party formed NTUC(National Trade Union Congress). The NTUC was under the care of C.V.Devan Nair.

At this time, there was this little thing called “Operation Coldstore”. The main goal of this operation was to “cripple communist activity”. This was to supposedly bring order and stability to the state because it was believed that communists were responsible for inciting unrest amongst workers and students.

Alleged “pro-communists” were rounded up under the Preservation of Public Safety Ordinance(PPSO). Members of the Barisan Socialis including Lim Chin Siong bore the brunt of this crackdown. SATU was also banned as a result of this crackdown leaving NTUC to be the sole association for labour concerns. This was of course not by coincidence that the fall of Barisan Socialis and SATU were simultaneously orchestrated. 

Albert Winsemius laments that “it’s to a certain extent a pity that these people, enthusiastic people with a feeling for their fellow human beings, with high intellectual, often organisational capacities got lost for Singapore.”11

The Charter for Industrial Progress was then put in place in 1965 to ensure that there was a “common conviction that the future and well being of the people of the State depends primarily on the continuing expansion of its economy through accelerated industrial growth.”12

Under “Negotiations and Arbitration” of “A Productivity Code of Practice for Trade Unions and Manufacturing Industries” , it is mentioned that “In case of disputes, both the trade union and employer will refrain from taking any industrial action and will endeavour to refer jointly to arbitration any dispute which cannot be settled through direct negotiation or conciliation.”13

Considering how the ruling party is called People’s Action Party, it’s quite amusing how “action” is not encouraged in industrial settings. This has also clarified something for me. The absence of “action” tends to render unions somewhat invisible.

Under “Cooperation Machinery”, joint productivity consultative councils were set up to provide guidance and promotion of productivity to enterprises employing over fifty employees. The council was represented by four individuals from management and labour respectively. Through this initiative, cooperation becomes intrinsic to the infrastructure of labour-management relations.

Albert Winsemius also famously says, “If the cooperation (between the unions, employers and state) does not come about, labour will suffer for it. Capital can go to other countries as it has already done. Enterprise can escape as it has done in the last few years.”14

In 1968, two labour laws were passed. The employment act and the industrial relations act.

The employment act standardised terms and conditions of employment. According to the TV programme created by the Singapore Broadcast Corporation in 1988, Diary of a Nation, the employment act entailed

  • Curtailing the right of unions to strike

  • Giving the employer sole rights to hire and fire

  • Increasing working hours

  • Reducing of overtime, leave and retirement benefits

The Industrial Relations (amendment) Act excluded certain issues such as recruitment, dismissal and retrenchment, from collective bargaining and specified new procedures for labour negotiation and conflict resolution. Promotion, transfer, recruitment, retrenchment, dismissal, reinstatement and allocation of duties are made non negotiable in favour of the employer.

The unions’ agreement to these new constraints in the employment act and industrial relations act helped create a framework for industrial peace. Survival was also a major selling point. In this sense, workers and their representatives had to cooperate for their own well being and interests.

The second primary thing that Albert Winsemius advised the Prime Minister on was to “let (the statue of) Stamford Raffles stand where he stands.”15 Stamford Raffles is a British national who is credited as being the founding father of modern Singapore. The reason for this is so “Singapore accepts colonial heritage and manifestation of goodwill and trust between Singapore and its colonists and other countries in the west. Singapore was not taking the nationalist approach.”16

This was potentially tricky because the “fabian socialist” governing body had to balance what residual anti-colonial tendencies with this embrace of “colonial heritage”. The task of nation building was just as crucial as the growth of industry. As a nation freshly liberated from past oppressive forces, eagerly embracing a “colonial heritage” would not reflect well against the backdrop of more revolutionary sentiments.

Perhaps S Rajaratnam who was the Minister of Labour stated the position of the government quite aptly as he addressed the implementation of the Industrial Relations (amendment) and employers act in 1968.

“Old slogans, old cries, old attitudes of twenty years ago have become irrelevant. The major objective to which all other issues should be subordinated is this. It is not the redistribution of wealth but the creation of wealth that should be our major and relentless concern.”17


1. Quah, Euston et al. Albert Winsemius and Singapore: Here It Is Going to Happen. World Scientific, 2022.
2. Lee, Soo Ann. Industrialization in Singapore. Camberwell, Vic. : Longman Australia, 1973.
3.Loh Kah Seng, et al. Theatres of Memory: Industrial Heritage of 20th Century Singapore. Ethos Books, 2022.
4. Lee, Soo Ann. Industrialization in Singapore. Camberwell, Vic. : Longman Australia, 1973.
5. United Nations, A Proposed Industrialisation Programme for the State. United Nations Commissioner for Technical Assistance, Department of Economics and Social Affairs 1963.
6. Loh Kah Seng, et al. Theatres of Memory: Industrial Heritage of 20th Century Singapore. Ethos Books, 2022.
7. Singapore Oral History Unit, interview with Albert Winsemius, 30 Aug-3 Sep 1982.
8. Singapore Oral History Unit, interview with Albert Winsemius, 30 Aug-3 Sep 1982.
9. NTUC (National Trade Union Congress) May Day Rally, 1968.
10. Tamboer, Kees, Albert Winsemius: ‘founding father of Singapore’, 1996.
11. Singapore Oral History Unit, interview with Albert Winsemius, 30 Aug-3 Sep 1982.
12. Woon Kin Chung, and Loo Ya Lee. 50 Years of Singapore’s Productivity Drive. World Scientific, 26 Dec. 2017.
13. Woon Kin Chung, and Loo Ya Lee. 50 Years of Singapore’s Productivity Drive. World Scientific, 26 Dec. 2017.
14. United Nations, A Proposed Industrialisation Programme for the State. United Nations Commissioner for Technical Assistance, Department of Economics and Social Affairs 1963.
15. Singapore Oral History Unit, interview with Albert Winsemius, 30 Aug-3 Sep 1982.
16. Singapore Oral History Unit, interview with Albert Winsemius, 30 Aug-3 Sep 1982.
17. Diary of a Nation (SBC 1988) - 15 August 1968: Changes in Labour Laws.