Asian values

In 1975, S. Rajaratnam gave a speech on Asian values in relation to modernisation and made the claim that Asian values or Asian “anything” may exist as an image but it has no reality. The objective of his speech was not to elaborate on “Asian values”. His true intention was to refute the notion that “Western values” proved superior in the journey towards modernisation. He also points out the problem of moral relativism in the West and blames this on liberties afforded to individuals.

“Traditional society might have erred in too rigid and sometimes irrational demarcation between right and wrong. But in the West in the name of progress nobody is clear as to what is right and what is wrong. The important thing is that everyone has the right to do his own thing. Authority and social discipline are constraints on personal freedom.”1

He also emphasizes that in developing countries such as Singapore, “Western Values” are detrimental to the state's existence. A life and death situation hangs on the loose thread that is ‘Asian Values’.

“But I know for certain that for Third World countries like Singapore, Western values as propagated by the Liberal Establishment would be fatal not only to modernisation but to our survival.”2

C.Y. Hoon states how the weaponization of “Asian Values” also contains a kind of relativism.

“The prime tactical premise of the 'Asian values' argument is cultural relativism. The argument is only comprehensible in relation to its 'Other'. The 'West' is essentialized and seen as the homogeneous 'Other'. Consensus, harmony, unity and community are values that are commonly proposed as the essence of Asian culture and identity.”3

C.Y. Hoon also clearly defines the premises of “Asian Values” as declared by the state. In this way, the state attempts to establish its own third way through ‘Asian Values’.

“The 'Asian values' theory, in brief, makes four claims.  First, human rights are not universal and neither can they be globalized. They emerge differently according to the context of particular social, economic, cultural and political conditions. Second, Asian societies are not centered on the individual but on the family. The nation is like a big family. It supposedly comes naturally for Asians to let the combined interests of the family and the nation go before the interests of each individual. Third, Asian societies rank social and economic rights over individual's political rights. Finally, the right of a nation to self-determination includes a government's domestic jurisdiction over human rights. This implies that other nations should not interfere with the internal affairs of a state, including its human rights policy.”4

Similar to factories approproating the term “family”, the state also invokes the image of the family through the vehicle of ‘Asian Values’.

“Asian values advocates assert that a nation is like a big family, the government is seen as the unchallengeable 'father' who is obliged to exercise both the disciplinarian and custodial roles, and society is deemed to be the children rights on developing countries is a who ought to obey the father in all circumstance.”5

This is also mentioned in State Fatherhood: The Politics of Nationalism, Sexuality, and Race in Singapore by Janadas Devan and Geraldine Heng.

“State fatherhood specifically requires, of course, the intimate articulation of the traditional family with the modern state, and the ostensible homology of the one to the other, claimed by Singapore Confucianism, facilitates and guarantees the transfer of the paternal signifier from the family to the state, the metaphor of state as family then rendering "natural" an "omnipotent government”.”6

The duality or binary of West versus East is also tied to ideas of self versus selflessness. Obedience is seen as an Asian trait in contrast to liberalism that is postured by the West. However, C.Y. Hoon also brings to attention how the Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew denied that he had given prominence to 'Asian values'.

  “Lee claimed that he had always advocated 'Confucian' values,    demonstrating the importance of Confucian ethics as essential    ingredients of East Asia's economic growth.”7

This delves further into a particular school of East Asian thought that indicates the state’s underlying objective of enforcing hierarchical systems. This could also be justification for the state’s strategies to stay in power through the continuity in ideologies. Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan also indicate how Confucianism creates a system that is conducive to the industrial and social needs of state power.

“The very discovery of Confucianism is articulated by the need to manage, not to resist, an increasingly successful industrial nation. Confucianism accordingly is promoted in Singapore as constitutive of the rational organisation of society, and has itself been submitted to stringent inquiry, that it might be systematically delivered as an object of knowledge, a rational and authoritative epistemology.”8

Albert Winsemius mentions how similarities between Confucianism and Calvinism may have been the reason how he was able to gel so well with the ruling party of Singapore. He also mentions that the “centre in Calvinist thinking is the family.”9 However, he does mention that in Confucianism one has to respect and obey the magistrate, unless they disregard their heavenly responsibility which is also similar in Calvinism. The individual has the “right of revolt” if the government misbehaves. This is not reflected in the state’s version of Confucianism as C.Y. Hoon points out.

“Not coincidentally, Confucius' teachings about paying respect and deference to one's government had been given special highlight by the Singaporean press whereas one that teaches that a vicious, man-eating tiger is less frightful than an oppressive Government had hardly been mentioned.”10

Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan labels this “internalised orientalism” that also engenders power through state fathering. 

“Whether it provisions the state with a schematic Confucianist system of knowledge or selected statistics from genetics and sociobiology, internalised orientalism serves a paternal master: a gendered formation of power absorbed in fantasmatic repetition, and seeking a reliable machinery of efficient self-regeneration.”11

In thinking about regeneration of state power, S.Rajaratnam speaks about the importance of distinguishing between the strong and disciplined versus the corrupt and tyrannical.

“There is confusion between strong and disciplined government and misgovernment by the corrupt and the tyrannical. Until the Third World can clear up this confusion, modernisation will be nothing more than the breaking down of the order without anything new and hopeful to take its place.”12

One speculates that this seems to be more of a blurred line than a clear one in our current times. The state might also want to consider the option of the “benevolent government” if it was still interested in engaging with Confucian values.


1-2. Seah, Chee Meow. Asian Values & Modernization. Ohio University Press, 1977.
3-5. Hoon, Chang Yau. Revisiting the Asian Values Argument Used by Asian Political Leaders and Its Validity. Vol. 32, no. 2, 2004.
6. Ong, Aihwa and Peletz, Michael G. Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia. Berkeley, Calif., University Of California Press, 1995.
7. Hoon, Chang Yau. Revisiting the Asian Values Argument Used by Asian Political Leaders and Its Validity. Vol. 32, no. 2, 2004.
8. Ong, Aihwa and Peletz, Michael G. Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia. Berkeley, Calif., University Of California Press, 1995.
9. Quah, Euston et al. Albert Winsemius and Singapore: Here It Is Going to Happen. World Scientific, 2022.
10. Hoon, Chang Yau. Revisiting the Asian Values Argument Used by Asian Political Leaders and Its Validity. Vol. 32, no. 2, 2004.
11. Ong, Aihwa and Peletz, Michael G. Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia. Berkeley, Calif., University Of California Press, 1995.
12. Seah, Chee Meow. Asian Values & Modernization. Ohio University Press, 1977.